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 Introduction 
 Despite the heightened interest in the African pharmaceutical market, 
there are constraints and challenges that continue to affect access to 
medicines. One of the key constraints is the high prices of medicines. 
In the private sector, wholesale and retail mark-ups have been found to 
range from 2% to 380% and from 10% to 552%, respectively (Cameron 
et al., 2011). A later study found wholesaler mark-ups between 25% and 
50% (IMS Health, 2014a; 2014b), and retail mark-ups between 25% and 
500% (Rosen and Rickwood, 2014). Local manufacturers and importers 
alike have expressed concern over the high mark-ups in the distribution 
chain, as the exorbitant prices are believed to limit patients’ access and 
sales. 
 African governments are all grappling with the issue of high medi-
cine prices. Coupled with the increasing momentum for developing 
local pharmaceutical industries, the issue of medicine prices and how 
to contain them will come into sharp focus for policy makers. African 
policy makers are also acutely aware of measures employed by other 
countries around the world to contain runaway health care costs, and 
specifically pharmaceutical expenditure. Although price controls are 
important policy instruments, they are very controversial. The South 
African experience with pharmaceutical price controls may therefore be 
a useful case study to inform other African countries’ interventions. 
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 This chapter presents the South African experience with the single 
exit price (SEP) regulations which were enacted to deal with these distor-
tions and to replace the mark-up-based retail pricing systems with fixed 
professional fees in order ultimately to reduce the price to patient. 
 Pharmaceutical price control options 
 Governments have moved to control prices, first, because the innovative 
pharmaceutical industry has historically been dominated by monopo-
lies, creating the tendency to price products at a premium. Medicines 
are also different from any other consumer goods in that patient is often 
price-insensitive, given that the doctor prescribes and a third party pays 
for the drugs. Furthermore, many consumers and health care profes-
sionals equate a higher-priced product with quality, and conversely see 
a lower-priced product as inferior, resulting in the ready acceptance to 
prescribe, dispense or ask for high-priced products. The challenge for 
governments therefore is how to institute proper controls to ensure that 
medicines are priced fairly and that access is not constrained by high 
prices. 
 The literature on pharmaceutical price controls identifies three 
distinct ways in which expenditure can be controlled: direct controls on 
the prices of medicines across various levels in the distribution chain; 
through demand-side measures including financial and reimbursement 
systems; and finally by influencing demand through the implementa-
tion of demand-side measures. 
 Price controls at the level of the manufacturer 
 The most difficult step in price controls is arriving at a reasonable or 
fair price for a medicine. The literature on price controls and the tools 
employed are mostly from high-income countries. These include the 
cost-plus method, profit caps, comparative pricing, direct price negotia-
tions and pharmaco-economic evaluations, or a combination of these 
tools. The cost-plus pricing model is difficult to employ in a country 
where most suppliers are subsidiaries of international companies or 
importers of products from other markets. In this scenario, experience 
shows that it is very difficult to obtain accurate and reliable data to 
arrive at a determination of real costs and profits. 
 The second method of price controls, using profit caps, is employed 
in, for example, the United Kingdom through the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS), whereby the government negotiates a reason-
able profit with companies for products sold to the National Health 
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Service. This method too faces difficulties with arriving at accurate costs 
and profits when dealing especially with subsidiaries of international 
companies and importers. 
 The third method is comparative pricing, comparing prices of prod-
ucts in other markets with local market prices. Complexities include 
varying dosage forms, strengths and trade names, and the fact that the 
margins and mark-ups allowed to players in the chain differ across terri-
tories. The Netherlands, for example, sets maximum permissible prices 
using the average wholesale price of similar products in a basket of coun-
tries including Belgium, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. It 
is reported that upon its introduction in 1996, Dutch pharmaceutical 
prices dropped by an average 20% (Rietveld and Haaijer-Ruskamp, 
2002). 
 The fourth commonly used tool involves direct price negotiations 
between buyers and pharmaceutical companies. In France, the govern-
ment directly controls prices through negotiations before a product is 
launched. Finally, pharmaco-economic evaluations are used by regula-
tors to attempt to arrive at a fair price, taking into consideration the 
societal costs of the disease and the costs of other treatments. Through 
economic modelling, the direct and indirect benefits of the drug are 
calculated and compared with alternative therapies. Pharmaco-economic 
evaluations are used extensively in the UK, Netherlands, Canada and 
Australia, among other markets (see also Chapter 13). 
 Price controls at the wholesale and pharmacy level 
 Wholesaler margins are controlled through setting either a maximum 
margin or a maximum price at which wholesalers can sell on to retail 
pharmacy. Margins in retail pharmacy can be controlled by setting a fixed 
percentage mark-up to the wholesale price of each medicine, by setting 
a maximum over all mark-up, or finally by tiered mark-ups where the 
percentage mark-up reduces as the price of the product increases. The 
fixed-margin system is widely used in Europe, with margins for prescrip-
tion drugs normally around 30%, whilst over-the-counter products are 
freed from price controls. Although margins are fixed, wholesalers may 
still be able to negotiate discounts and thus increase their profits. The 
tiered structure is intended to create disincentives for dispensing more 
expensive products. 
 Some countries, including China, have a system of price controls that 
differentiates between imported and locally produced products (Bao, 
2000). The Chinese system also differentiates based on drug classes: 
basic therapeutic and preventive drugs acquired in large volumes, class 1 
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anti-psychotics, anaesthetic agents, contraceptives and other special 
classes. 
 Other measures to influence prices 
 There are other demand-side measures that can influence prices and 
expenditure. These include positive and negative lists, reference prices, 
co-payments, parallel importation, and generic substitution, as well as 
education of health care professionals and the public. A negative list 
of products that are not reimbursed forces companies to lower prices 
in order to gain a listing on the positive list. Similarly, reference prices, 
which are used to benchmark products in the same therapeutic category 
that are assigned a certain price cap, and related demand-side measures 
such as co-payments, are meant to force patients to opt for the cheaper 
medicines. Generic substitution and closely related educational meas-
ures to educate health care professionals and patients about the quality 
and benefits of generic medicine are other demand-side measures that 
have been employed to lower medicine expenditure. 
 The basis of the South African price control regime 
 Implications of the two-tier South African health care system 
 When the first democratic government in South Africa came into power 
in April 1994, it inherited a two-tier health care system (private and 
public) reflective of the country’s divided history. These two tiers have 
widely differing resources and access medicines via different channels. 
The private health care tier is a well-resourced private insurance-based 
world-class platform which serves an estimated 15% of the popula-
tion (Council for Medical Schemes, 2014). The private pharmaceutical 
market is valued at $4.1 billion (IMS Health, 2014b) and is supplied with 
medicines by about 130 manufacturers and importers supplying 5,000 
product lines. 
 The second tier, the public sector health care system, serves the 
remaining 85% of the population. It is under-resourced, with chronic 
staff shortages, a quadruple burden of disease and systemic lack of 
funding. Public sector supplies are obtained through tenders adminis-
tered by the Central Procurement Unit of the Department of Health. It is 
supplied with 2,400 product lines by an estimated 90 manufacturers and 
importers, at an estimated value of $1 billion a year in 2014. 1 
 Besides these deep divisions, the democratic government faced spiral-
ling health care costs and an increasingly exclusionary health care 
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system, in which those who served the poor and marginalized were 
paying more for medicines than those in the affluent areas who were 
more likely to benefit from price and volume discounts, rebates, bonuses 
and other incentives. The pricing of medicines had historically been 
left to market forces, so companies were free to price their products as 
they wished, to offer bonuses and deals, discounts and rebates, and to 
discriminate among clients on the basis of volume of purchases and 
other considerations. The government therefore decided to intervene to 
correct the distortions. 
 Despite the large literature on pharmaceutical price controls in highly 
developed markets with well-developed health insurance schemes and 
universal coverage (Rietveld and Haaijer-Ruskamp, 2002), there was 
little from the developing world with similar health care systems to 
South Africa with a significant portion of patients without health care 
insurance and with considerable out-of-pocket expenditure on health 
care and medicines. 
 The government was also aware of developments internationally, 
where high medicines prices were receiving global attention from 
governments and consumers alike. Further, they were acutely aware that 
price controls have to be enacted in such a way that they still create 
headroom for market forces to work to exert further downward pressure 
on pricing. In trying to come up with mechanisms to control prices, 
the government looked to emulate countries that had successfully intro-
duced controls and managed to reduce, contain and sustain medicine 
expenditure. 
 A further challenge faced by South Africa was the huge fragmenta-
tion of the distribution channel, unlike the Western world where there 
are a few distributors and wholesalers controlling the entire distribution 
chain, and hence enjoying economies of scale. So the choice of policy 
options to contain drug costs would have to take into consideration the 
country’s unique health care structure. 
 The South African rationale for price controls 
 The government believed that medicines were public utility goods, and 
not mere commodities, and that it could no longer allow a situation 
where companies priced their products as they pleased. This was rein-
forced by their view that the prevailing drug prices in South Africa were 
inflated artificially through the elaborate system of bonuses, discounts, 
rebates and other perverse incentives systems that led to the dispensing 
of more expensive drugs, and irrational use of drugs. These perverse 
incentives, the state alleged, added an additional 50% to the final cost 
208 Skhumbuzo Ngozwana
of the drug. The Department of Health claimed that South Africa was 
among the world’s top five most expensive medicine markets. 
 The Department of Health’s position was strongly challenged by the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) of South Africa, who 
held the claims were devoid of truth and based on an unfair comparison. 
The PMA held that the Department of Health was trying to influence 
the public and create the impression that the pharmaceutical industry 
was responsible for the high medicine costs, in order to introduce meas-
ures to control the industry. To circumvent this, the PMA approached 
the office of the Public Protector to make a determination whether the 
statements made by the Department of Health, perceived as laying the 
groundwork for price controls, were factual. 
 A key contention was that the Department had compared prices of 
products sold in the South African retail sector with prices of multi-source 
products sold by a prominent global NGO, the International Dispensary 
Association, which supplies developing countries with generics bought 
internationally in bulk. The PMA’s position was that the department was 
using an untenable comparison to justify the introduction of medicine 
registration and pricing reform in South Africa, whilst ignoring the fact 
that patient prices were often double the ex-manufacturer prices, and 
that various studies had indicated that South African prices were on par 
with international prices. 
 Despite the PMA’s efforts to block the reforms, the government made 
clear that they would immediately take measures to correct the disparities 
and distortions. In this regard, a number of key government policies – 
legislative and regulatory provisions – were enacted. The next section 
reviews the constitutional mandate that led to the interventions. 
 Constitutional enablers of the National Drug Policy 
 On 8 May 1996, the democratically elected parliament adopted the new 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 2 This enshrined a Bill of 
Rights. Section 27 underpinned the legislative and regulatory processes 
that would follow in reforming the health sector; it read: 
 Section 27 (1) (a); everyone has the right to have access to healthcare 
services, including reproductive health. 
 Section 27 (2): the state must take all reasonable legislative and other 
measures within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights. 
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 Informed by this provision in the constitution, and acutely aware of 
the urgency to address the imbalances of the past, to create a new and 
equitable health care system with universal access to affordable quality 
health care for all, and ensure the progressive realization of Section 27, 
the government introduced a number of policy papers which would 
drive far-reaching regulatory and legislative reforms. The most impor-
tant was the National Drug Policy (NDP) of 1996. The NDP had far-
reaching implications, laying the basis for the Single Exit Price (SEP) 
regulations discussed below. 
 National Drug Policy 
 The NDP (Department of Health, 1996) was aimed broadly at increasing 
access to safe, affordable quality medicines for all South Africans, and 
laid the foundation for all the subsequent legislative and regulative 
revisions and amendments. Specifically, the NDP’s objective was ‘[t]o 
promote the availability of safe and effective drugs at the lowest possible 
cost’. The NDP intended to rationalize the pricing structure of drugs and 
included the following to realize that aim:
 the appointment of a Pricing Committee;  ●
 introducing total transparency in the pricing structure of pharmaceu- ●
tical manufacturers, wholesalers and dispensers of drugs; 
 introducing a non-discriminatory pricing system;  ●
 replacing the wholesale and retail percentage-based mark-up system  ●
with a fixed professional fee; 
 regulating price increases.  ●
 The far-reaching aims of the NDP found expression in the amendment 
to the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965. The 
new Act 90 of 1997 introduced, among others, sections dealing with 
bonuses and samples (18 A and B), the ethical marketing of pharmaceu-
ticals (18C), generic substitution (22F) and the creation of the Pricing 
Committee and enactment of the single exit price regulations (22G). 
 The Medicines and Related Substances Act 
 Before the introduction of the SEP regulations, the South African phar-
maceutical market was dominated by innovator brands, with very little 
generic penetration. Medicines were promoted directly to doctors and 
pharmacists, who often received samples, bonuses and many other 
incentives to drive the prescription or dispensing of particular drugs. 
These practices led to doctors often prescribing more expensive drugs. 
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 The amended Medicines Act made provisions for the parallel impor-
tation of medicines into South Africa by others other than the patent 
holder (15C), the prohibition of bonusing, rebates and any other incen-
tive scheme (18A), prohibition of sampling of medicines (18B), manda-
tory generic substitution (22F) and the formation of a Pricing Committee 
and the clauses governing its mandate 3 (22G), namely that:
 (1) The Minister shall appoint such persons as he or she may deem fit to 
be members of a committee to be known as the pricing committee. 
 (2) The minister may, on the recommendation of the Pricing Committee 
make regulations 
 (a) on the introduction of a transparent pricing system for all medi-
cines and scheduled substances sold in the republic 
 (b) on an appropriate dispensing fee to be charged by a pharmacists 
or person licensed in terms of Section 22 C (1) (a). 
 (3) The transparent pricing system contemplated in sub-section (2) (a) 
shall include a single exit price which shall be the only price at which 
manufacturers shall sell medicines and scheduled substances to any 
person other than the state. 
 The provisions contained in the amendment to the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 were immediately chal-
lenged in court by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa (PMA), who felt that the Department had overreached itself 
in drafting the act. Although the PMA withdrew its court challenge in 
2001 following an international outcry and mounting international and 
civil society pressure, the regulations pertaining to a Transparent Pricing 
System for Medicines and Scheduled Substances 4 only came into effect 
on 2 May 2004. 
 The Single Exit Price regulations 
 South Africa’s attempt to control prices at wholesale level has elements 
of a fixed professional fee but with a fixed maximum, based on a tiered 
scale that considers the price of the product. At retail pharmacy level, 
the professional fees are also fixed, on a tiered system that endeavours 
to promote the dispensing of cheaper products. Over-the-counter prod-
ucts are exempted from controls, but pharmacists cannot benefit from 
discounts as they do in Europe. 
 The SEP was defined by the regulations as a composite of the manu-
facturer’s exit price, plus the distribution or logistics fee and a 14% value 
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added tax (VAT). The SEP thereby derived would be the one and only 
price at which wholesalers, pharmacies and other people allowed to 
dispense in terms of Section 22C (1) (a) could sell the medicine in South 
Africa, irrespective of the volumes purchased. The SEP would control 
pricing throughout the pharmaceutical value chain, setting dispensing 
fees for pharmacists and logistics fees for wholesalers and distributors. 
 The final price to the end user would include the SEP and the profes-
sional (dispensing fee) for the service rendered. Whilst companies would 
have the freedom to set initial prices, the pricing committee would 
decide on an annual price increase in accordance with a methodology 
in the SEP regulations. 
 Whilst the introduction of the SEP was widely criticized and seen as an 
anti-private-sector move by the new democratic government, the high 
prices of medicines had received attention previously from government 
commissions under the National Party. The three previous commis-
sions – the Snyman Commission (1962), the Steenkamp Commission 
(1978) and the Browne Commission (1985) – had also made recom-
mendations including curbing excessive medicine promotions, generic 
substitution, issuing of compulsory licences, calling for the state to 
participate in the supply of medicines through a tender system and for 
the state to investigate the introduction of price controls. 
 Setting the regulations 
 The Minister of Health appointed a pricing committee with representa-
tion from the Departments of Trade and Industry and Finance and the 
Competition Commission. The committee had pharmacists, lawyers, 
health economists, pharmaco-economists, academics and consumer 
representatives, but no industry representation. Their mandate was to 
establish a new regime of total transparency in the pricing structure of all 
prescription medicines and over-the-counter products. The committee 
would also set up regulations for logistics and dispensing fees, inter-
national benchmarking of pharmaceuticals and pharmaco-economic 
evaluation of medicines. 
 The government stated that, when fully implemented, it expected the 
SEP regulations to reduce the prices of medicines by 40–70%. In line 
with the regulations, effective 2 August 2004 and for a year thereafter, 
the price of medicines would not be higher than 50% of the ‘Blue Book’ 
manufacturer net price. 5 The Blue Book was a well-known industry 
publication that supplied the pharmaceutical industry and health care 
sector with independent and accurate price lists. The government held 
that the manufacturer net price listed in the Blue Book was inflated to 
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cater for the complex systems of bonuses, rebates and other incentives 
at play in the industry, in order to allow the retail chains to acquire 
drugs at below 50% of the listed Blue Book price. 
 The SEP regulation 8 allowed for a manufacturer to set their single exit 
price, which could only be raised once on an annual basis, whilst tempo-
rary price reductions were allowed as often as the manufacturer wanted 
to make them for competitive reasons. The SEP could be increased 
only once a year based on a predetermined formula 6 that incorporated, 
among others, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Producer Price Index 
(PPI) for the preceding year; changes in the rates of foreign exchange 
and purchasing power parity; and the need to ensure the availability, 
affordability and quality of medicines. The currencies considered are the 
US Dollar and the Euro, as most South African pharmaceutical compa-
nies purchase products and inputs of production from abroad with these 
two currencies. 
 The final increase as per formula is calculated as follows:
 API Formula  =  70% CPI (historical) + 15% (Rand/Dollar variance) 
+ 15% (Rand/Euro variance) 
 The exchange rate split of 15% US$ and 15% Euro was based on data 
provided by the Department of Trade and Industry and data on pharma-
ceutical imports. 
 Although this formula has been applied from the beginning, the 
actual price increases granted by the MoH have displayed a degree of 
discretion, and the timing has often been delayed, in some cases by up 
to five months. 
 Manufacturers can also apply for increases above the formula-based 
increases, to assist manufacturers and importers to compensate for 
exchange-rate-related increases in the prices of production inputs or 
finished products imported from principals overseas. The exceptional 
circumstances under which the minister would authorize such an 
increase were adverse financial, operational and other consequences 
for the manufacturer; adverse effects on the availability of the medi-
cine in South Africa should the increase not be granted; the nature of 
the disease the medicine was registered for; resultant adverse effects on 
public health; and lastly, to ensure that the constitutional obligations 
were not abrogated. 
 Finally, the Director General of the Department of Health could 
inform the public if she or he felt that the single exit price of a medicine 
was unreasonable. Manufacturers and importers were required to inform 
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the Director General six months before the registration of a medicine 
the intended SEP, the countries where the product was sold and how 
much it was selling for, the costs of manufacturing, and the marketing 
and selling costs of the product. 
 At inception, the regulations stipulated the maximum professional 
fees that could be added to the single exit price by various players in the 
distribution chain. 
 Controversies and challenges 
 The SEP regulations were immediately challenged in court by various 
organizations. The pharmacy groups contended that the fees were not 
sufficient for them to survive, and that the stipulated professional fees 
threatened the survival of many independent pharmacies. Further, the 
Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa (PSSA), a large retail pharmacy 
chain, New Click (Pty) Ltd, and others argued that the Department 
had overreached itself in promulgating the regulations. The Cape High 
Court found in favour of the state and dismissed the case, although the 
dissenting judgment 7 held that it was difficult to understand how the 
SEP was arrived at; that the logistics fee regulations were contradictory 
and at odds with other legislation; and that the dispensing fee had been 
based ‘on no more than a thumb suck’ and a simplistic ‘one size fits all’ 
approach. The PSSA, New Clicks and others appealed the Cape High 
Court ruling, and the case went to the Supreme Court of Appeal where 
the Cape High Court decision was overturned. 
 The Supreme Court of Appeal, in overturning the decision of the Cape 
High Court, made this finding 8 :
 The order of the court below is set aside and replaced with the 
following order in each application: 
 (a)  The ‘Regulations relating to a Transparent Pricing System for 
Medicines and Scheduled Substances’ as published in GN R553 on 
30 April 2004 are declared invalid and of no force and effect. 
 The state in turn appealed, and the case went all the way to the 
Constitutional Court, which ruled that the Department had indeed 
acted within the law, but ordered the Department to go back to the 
drawing board and review the professional fees. 
 The Department of Health adjusted the proposed dispensing fee 
to 26% of SEP to a maximum of R26. This proposal was immediately 
214 Skhumbuzo Ngozwana
rejected by the Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa, once again on 
the grounds that it was insufficient and would cause unnecessary hard-
ship to their members and eventual closure of pharmacies. The PSSA 
proposed a tiered dispensing fee system with average fees of R37, a 
proposal that found no favour with the Department of Health. 
 Following these court challenges and negotiations between the various 
parties, the dispensing fee and the logistic fees have gone through 
various iterations, and have now been finalized. The June dispensing 
fee was first published in March 2006, and was immediately rejected by 
pharmacists. This was then replaced with a new proposal of June 2009. 
More discussions and consultations followed, and the last iteration was 
published in June 2014 (Table 11.1). The table shows the complex calcu-
lations of the permitted fee for each band of the SEP, at the various revi-
sion dates. 
 The proposed dispensing fees were revised upwards over time as 
pharmacists complained that their business would be unsustainable 
(Table 11.1). The lowest tier has stayed below R100 (US$8.50) and the 
fixed fee was reduced, but the dispensing fee has been revised upwards 
with the adjustment of the percentage of the total medicine price. In 
the top tier of products above R799.85 (US$67.80), the fee has also been 
adjusted upwards through a revision of both the fixed component and 
the percentage of the medicine price 
 Logistics fee 
 Prior to publication of the logistics fee regulation, wholesalers and 
manufacturers negotiated the logistics fee independently, and there 
were reports of widely varying logistics fees, with some companies 
paying in the high double digits. Innovator companies with patent-
protected products that wholesalers were desperate to stock would often 
pay in the low single digits, whilst some did not pay any logistics fees at 
all. This position put the generic pharmaceutical industry at a distinct 
disadvantage, as wholesalers would often squeeze generic companies 
for bigger logistics fees to make up for the loss with innovator compa-
nies. The government finally moved to regulate the logistics fee, and 
in March 2011 published the first draft regulations for Logistics Fees 
(LF). The second iteration was published in September 2012 following 
negotiations and discussions with providers of logistical services. The 
fee involves four tiers, with a LF of 8% of the ex-manufacturer price 
excluding VAT + R3 ($0.25) for items less that R100 (US$ 8.50), and a LF 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Despite representations from wholesalers and support from the 
generics industry for the logistics fee to include a minimum fee and a 
fixed cap, the department rejected that application on the grounds that 
having a fixed minimum would be anti-competitive. It published the 
final logistics fee with only a fixed cap. Manufacturers and importers 
would be free to negotiate a fee up to the capped level with whole-
salers. The regulations also stipulated that where the current logistics 
fee exceeds the current caps, manufactures and providers of logistical 
services must negotiate to reduce the fee within 60 days of publication 
of final logistics fees. The regulations, however, allowed the minister 
to authorize a manufacturer or importer to increase the logistics fee in 
exceptional circumstances. 
 Experience with the Single Exit Price regulations to date 
 Price increases under the regulations 
 Table 11.2 below captures the experience with the SEP to date. It shows 
the quantum as determined by the SEP methodology and the eventual 
increase granted by the Minister. 
 It is clear from the table that the minister has not always adhered to 
the formula, and has exercised discretion in granting increases – a sore 
point for the industry. 
 Although the industry has complained about the low increases from 
inception, experience shows that since the introduction of the SEP, 
they have not always taken the full increase granted. In fact, temporary 
price reductions have been taken frequently within the period of an 
 Table 11.2  SEP increases since the implementation of the SEP (%) 
 Year 
 SEP calculation as per 
methodology (%) 
 SEP granted by 
the Minister (%)  Variance 





2008 8.40 6.50 –1.90
2009 12.12 13.2 +1.08
2010 9.90 7.40 –2.50
2011 –2.10 0.00 N/A
2012 6.90 2.14 –4.76
2013 8.20 5.80 –2.40
2014 8.90 5.80 –3.10
 Source : National Department of Health, Pharmaceutical Task Group, author analysis. 
Controlling Prices of Medicines: South Africa 217
SEP increase. This has largely been for competitive reasons, and at times 
motivated by the need to sell short dated stock before it expires. 
 A further justifiable complaint is that the Department of Health delays 
the increases, so companies lose out. For example, in 2010, there was 
a five-month delay between the increase and the time that companies 
could take the increase. These delays occurred as a consequence of 
the ‘application’ process introduced, and decisions to accept applica-
tions only from 1 April. Given the 30-day approval process, the earliest 
companies can take an increase is 1 May, which leaves companies with 
just seven months to enjoy the price increase. Besides these delays, there 
were also frequent rejections due to such matters as formatting issues on 
the SEP increase application template, Department of Health database 
discrepancies and missing documentation. 
 SEP impact on prices 
 The experience of South Africa with price controls demonstrates that, 
contrary to popular opinion, the Department of Health conceptualized 
a regime based on global practice and tried to blend a number of instru-
ments with a good historical record of effectiveness in other countries. 
 In terms of controls at the manufacturer level, in attempting to arrive 
at a fair ex-manufacturer price, and considering the complexities of 
setting a fair price in a predominantly import based industry, the govern-
ment settled arbitrarily on 50% of the Blue Book price on the basis that 
prices were inflated by the same figure to make up for the incentives, 
bonuses, sampling and other perversities in the system. The price nego-
tiation component between companies and government has only been 
recently employed for state procurement, where besides published refer-
ence prices, the Central Procurement Unit can and does directly nego-
tiate prices with manufactures, especially if they are not too far from the 
reference prices listed. At the same time, elements of comparative pricing 
were built into the regulations through the International Benchmarking 
provisions wherein South African prices would be compared to a basket 
of prices in five countries including Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and Spain. Similarly, pharmaco-economic evaluations were also built 
into the regulations, although these and comparative pricing through 
benchmarking have yet to be finalized. 
 When it comes to other measures to control prices, South Africa has 
not adopted positive and negative lists, whilst experience with demand-
side measures such as reference prices, co-payments, and generic substi-
tution and education of health care professionals and the public is 
mixed. Private health care insurance schemes all have reference pricing 
218 Skhumbuzo Ngozwana
systems in place, and accompanying co-payments if patients elect to 
use more expensive products outside the formulary and reference prices. 
Government enacted provisions for mandatory generic substitution, 
and although this and other measures have seen generic usage increase 
from the mid-20% in 2002 to around 60% by volume (IMS Health, 
2014a), there is still scope for more growth. To this extent, the govern-
ment can do more to educate patients about the safety, quality and effi-
cacy of generic medicines, as well as the benefits for patients and health 
systems. This is an area that still requires much work. 
 There is general acceptance that the introduction of the SEP regime has 
resulted in a downward impact on the prices of medicines. The graph in 
Figure 11.1 is drawn from data from the Council of Medical Schemes, 
which publishes an annual report detailing, among other things, total 
health care expenditure in the private sector, and looks at the contribu-
tion of the various players. 
 The Department of Health reported savings of 19%, made up of 
25–50% for generic medicine prices and 12% for originator medi-
cines. 9 IMS Health reported an average drop in medicine prices of 24% 
between June 2003 and June 2006 (Vokes, 2007) since the introduc-
tion of the SEP. Similarly, Emsley and Booysen (2004) reported that the 
introduction of the SEP had resulted in a reduction of 36.7% in the 
prices of quetiapine and 13% for haloperidol. Admittedly, that paper 











































































 Figure 11.1  Medicine contribution to total private health care costs 
 Source : Drawn by the author from data from Council for Medical Schemes (2014). 
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not clear if the reductions have been sustained. Further evidence of the 
impact of SEP on prices was reported by Steyn et al. (2007), who demon-
strated that the SEP regime had reduced the average cost of anti-diabetic 
medicines by around 29.6%. Finally, the biggest private health insur-
ance company, Discovery Medical Aid, reported: ‘Because of the single 
exit price legislation, these drug price reductions benefit all users in the 
private healthcare system. Conservative estimates suggest total annual 
savings of about R 319 million per year are achieved for the scheme in 
medicine expenditure’ (DHMS, 2012). 
 The media and other parties have also reported extensively on the 
impact of these price regulations. For example, the  Mail and Guardian , 
South Africa’s leading weekly newspaper, reported on 26 February 
2008: ‘The introduction of medicine pricing regulations a few years ago 
resulted in a 20% drop in prices, and savings of over R 2.3 billion on 
medicines’. 
 Other reports and theses, especially looking at the impact of the SEP on 
the pharmacy profession, and occasionally on the patient, do however 
offer a different view of the impact. They describe a profession decimated 
by the regulations, with multiple closures of pharmacies, especially in 
rural areas. Although critically important and requiring further critical 
academic enquiry, they are outside the scope of this chapter. There is 
also anecdotal evidence that the early gains made may be slowly eroding 
as the contribution of medicines to overall health care costs continues 
to creep up, albeit slowly. Whether this is purely a factor of the SEP poli-
cies starting to fall short, or because of increased medicines usage, or the 
impact of pseudo-generics which tend to crowd out true generics and 
inflate prices, or other factors, requires further study. 
 SEP impact on manufacturers and access to medicines 
 It is accepted internationally that the entry of generics significantly 
widens access to medicines, and the size (volume) of the market often 
expands after patent expiry. The impact of the SEP regime on access to 
medicines is an area that still requires further investigation. 
 The reference prices are normally set with the first generic entrants 
and often undergo revisions with further entry. In certain instances, the 
revisions have been quite dramatic, leading to wholesale price decreases, 
further lowering the price of the drug and indirectly promoting access. 
The case of simvastatin is instructive. Simvastatin is highly genericized, 
with the first generic product launched in 2002 by Adcock Ingram. 
Adcock remained the clear market leader despite other generic alterna-
tives. In 2009, Michol, a new simvastatin generic entrant, came in at a 
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very low SEP, and as a consequence the prices of a pack of 30 simvastatin 
tablets dropped from over R120 to around R25. Arguably, the effect of 
this would have been to increase access by patients, especially those 
who pay out of pocket for package deals that include consultation fees 
and medicines from family practitioners. 
 The impact of the SEP has also come through in capping prices through 
private medical schemes’ reference pricing systems. All the private 
medical insurance schemes have their own reference pricing systems 
to set the maximum price a scheme will pay for a generic drug. The 
effect has been to force newly launched generics to price below the refer-
ence price, and in some instances to compel the innovator to drop their 
prices or face the risk of their products facing co-payments. Similarly, if, 
for competitive reasons, a generic manufacturer drops prices drastically 
and sets a new reference price, other companies are forced to follow suit 
or face the prospect of co-payments, which will deter patients. 
 Impact on manufacturers 
 Manufacturers have complained that the SEP regime has put the sector 
under pressure, as the SEP increases are insufficient to offset the effect of 
the weaker Rand, coupled with wage and utilities inflation. This leads to 
reduced earnings and threatens the commercial viability of some product 
lines. Given that most companies import both the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients and other raw materials from overseas, the weakening of the 
Rand in a price-controlled environment leads to significantly higher cost 
of goods sold, without the recourse to increase prices to offset that. This 
is particularly so because although the regulations have a mechanism 
for extraordinary prices increases, companies complain that the process 
is onerous, hugely bureaucratic and difficult to access. These pressures 
have led to some manufacturers discussing discontinuation of some 
products. Recently, it was reported that Fresenius Kabi had withdrawn 
one product, Voluven, from the market, although the company stated 
that the withdrawal was not related to cost pressures (Bateman, 2014). 
 Delays are also a major problem for manufacturers. When a company 
applies for an SEP for a new product, or informs the Department of 
an SEP price adjustment, the Department ‘approves’ and then notifies 
price vendors such as Medikredit. The product is then allocated a NAPPI 
(billing) code, after which it can be sold on the South African market. 
Companies complain that delays in assessing the SEP applications and 
informing vendors delays market access for new products, and in the 
case especially of first-to-market generics, restricts and denies patients 
access to cheaper products. Although the regulations envisaged that the 
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SEP would be agreed within 48 hours of notifying the Department of 
Health, the process has evolved to one of ‘approval’, and delays of up to 
a month are not uncommon. 
 The potential closure of independent community pharmacies in rural 
and remote areas, mentioned above, may clearly reduce access. The 
Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa opposed the SEP regulations and 
the dispensing fees on the basis that they threatened the viability of 
independent community pharmacy. Since the early court challenges, 
there have been widespread reports that some community pharmacies 
did go into bankruptcy. The Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa 
reports that many small town and rural pharmacies have closed (PSSA, 
2014) negatively affecting access. Dodd (2007) demonstrated that inde-
pendent pharmacies saw net profits fall, that the price controls could 
push some pharmacies into bankruptcy and that closure of pharmacies 
in remote and rural areas would render the distribution of medicines 
economically unviable and thus affect access. 
 Some contend, furthermore, that the SEP regime has the unintended 
consequence of keeping prices higher than they would otherwise have 
been. They argue that late entrants often find it impossible to offer 
discounts on the prevailing prices, given that medical schemes will still 
reimburse up to the level of the reference price, so there is no incentive 
for pharmacists to offer the lower-priced product. This is compounded 
by the fact that the dispensing fee is calculated as a percentage of the 
price of the drug, inadvertently incentivizing pharmacists to dispense 
the highest-priced generic as long as it is within the reference price 
band. 
 Finally, it is argued that the SEP regime creates a disincentive for new 
entrants to offer lower entry prices. Some experts believe that because 
companies know that they will struggle to get price increases (Medical 
Chronical, 2012) sufficient to offset inflationary pressures and Rand 
weakness, among other challenges, they deliberately set high prices 
from the outset, possibly reducing access. The proponents of this view 
note that medicine prices in South Africa are artificially inflated, and 
higher in comparison to the same products in other countries. 
 Conclusion: are there lessons for other African countries? 
 South Africa embarked on the SEP path exactly a decade ago, informed 
by the realization that, as public utility goods, medicine prices could not 
be left to the vagaries of the market. In that time, there has been much 
acrimony, public disagreements in the media and other public spaces 
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between the main protagonists. Throughout all of this, the Department 
of Health, backed by the government and the ruling party, as well as 
public health and patient advocates, held firm. There have been threats 
of court cases, and many actual court cases, which have invariably led 
to iterations of the dispensing and logistics fees. What has emerged, 
though, is that through proper consultation and a willingness to open 
up and present the evidence base for positions held on various issues, it 
is possible to move towards negotiated positions. The first critical lesson 
for those who would want to embark on the price regulation route, 
therefore, is the absolute necessity of having clear and unambiguous 
political support for reform. Without this, there is no hope for success. 
 The second key lesson from South Africa’s journey with price 
regulations is the necessity of involving all key stakeholders in the 
process very early on. Governments and policy makers must take the 
private sector into their confidence and clearly and firmly explain 
the rationale for their decisions, ensuring that all views and all aspects 
are taken into consideration beforehand. Arguably, if the South African 
Department of Health had embarked on an exercise with the pharmacy 
profession, escorted by reputable independent and honest brokers, to 
arrive at a reasonable and evidence-based dispensing fee, there would 
have been no need for court cases, nor for the time spent in the last 
couple of years on endless consultations and the various iterations of 
the dispensing fee. 
 Third, it is imperative to collect the evidence base to guide policy 
decisions to be taken before embarking on a price reform process. This 
means making a full and thorough assessment of the entire distribu-
tion chain and finding the factors at play with each of the stakeholders. 
In the South African example, the R26/26% dispensing regime was no 
danger to the big retail chains, but threatened the survival of the small 
community pharmacy. 
 Fourth, it is imperative to make both the interpretation and implemen-
tation of any regulatory processes as simple as possible. The complexity 
that crept into the South African SEP regime and the bureaucratization 
of the process only served to make the pricing regime more unpopular. 
A measure of predictability and certainty around the application and 
approval process, the time periods for taking the increases and so forth 
would have lessened the tension between industry and the regulators. 
 Finally, although the SEP regime seems to have had a positive impact 
on prices, it is clear that supply-side measures on their own have only 
limited impact. It is thus critical for those governments that intend to 
regulate prices to devote equal attention to the demand side. This can be 
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done, among other methods, through massive patient education about 
the benefits of generic medicines, the incentivization of health care 
professionals to prescribe or dispense the cheapest products – above and 
beyond the dispensing fee – and the need to adopt generic prescribing 
across the board. 
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